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A CASE OF UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTIONS:
THE USE AND MISUSE OF THE STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF CASTANEDA/HAZELWOOD
IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
THOMAS J. SUGRUE AND WILLIAM B. FAIRLEY *
In Castaneda v. Partidai the Supreme Court of the United States for the first
time used formal statistical methods to determine whether data showing an
underrepresentation of a particular ethnic group among persons selected to
serve on grand juries supported an inference of discrimination against that
group in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution. Later the same term, the Court applied the particular
statistical test used in Castaneda to issues of racial discrimination in employment
in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 2 a case brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.$ The analytic approach adopted in the Castaneda
and Hazelwood cases consists of the use of a particular statistical model to
calculate both the "expected" results of an ethnically or racially neutral system
and the likelihood of seeing differences from those expected results as large or
larger than those actually observed. If the observed differences, considered in
relation to the size of the sample to which they refer, are of such a magnitude
* Thomas J. Sugrue, B.S., Boston College, 1968, M.P.P., Harvard, 1975, J.D.,
Harvard, 1975, is a member of the District of Columbia Bar and practices at the firm of Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering. William B. Fairley, B.A., Swarthmore, 1960, Ph.D., Harvard, 1968, is an
economist and statistician at Analysis and Inference, Inc., a research and consulting company in
Boston, Massachusetts.
The authors acknowledge with appreciation the helpful comments on drafts of this arti-
cle provided by Arlene Ash, David Baldus, William Lake, Jay Lapin, Michael Meyer, and
Stephan Michelson. The authors alone, however, are responsible for any errors or omissions in
the article.
430 U.S. 482 (1977).
• 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Tide VII provides, in S 703(a)(1), that it is
unlawful employment practice for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
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that they would be very unlikely to occur as the chance result of a neutral
system,* the plaintiff is deemed to have made out a prima facie case,' thereby
shifting to the defendant the burden of rebutting the plaintiff's statistical proof
by demonstrating that it is "inaccurate or insignificant"' or by identifying
nondiscriminatory factors that account for the observed differences.' The ad-
vantage of using a formal statistical model in such a case is that it allows the
factfinder to draw inferences from the data that are more accurate and
mathematically meaningful than those obtained through "eyeballing" the data
or simple arithmetic comparisons.
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Castaneda and Hazelwood, the statistical
model developed in those cases has been applied by lower courts and litigants
to statistical evidence of discrimination in a wide variety of contexts.° The
validity of the Castaneda/Hazelwood model, however, depends on a number of
assumptions not spelled out by the Court that are not met in a large number of
Such differences are said, as a matter of definition within the field of statistics, to be
"statistically significant." An analysis of statistical significance of a difference is most helpful
when it reports the probability that, if the difference were the result of a neutral system that
operated in accordance with the assumptions of the statistical model chosen to describe it, a dif-
ference as large or larger than it would be observed. This probability is called the "descriptive
significance level" associated with the difference as interpreted by the model. Sometimes the
probability itself is not reported and instead only the result of comparing it to some chosen stand-
ard "level of significance," often taken to be 1%, 5% or 10%. If the probability is lower than the
standard, then the difference is declared to be "statistically significant" at that level; if higher, it
is declared to be "not statistically significant" at that level. Basic statistics texts which discuss the
concept of statistical significance are F. MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE, & G. THOMAS, PROBABILITY
WITH STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as MOSTELLER, ROURKE &
THOMAS) and G. SNEDECOR & W. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS (7th ed. 1980)
(hereinafter cited as SNEDECOR & COCHRAN).
Moreover, in D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
(1980) (hereinafter cited as BALDUS & COLE) the significance concept is discussed with specific
application to discrimination cases. See id. at S§ 9.2-9.4. Statistical significance is a subtle and
technical concept that when properly applied can be a powerful tool in appraising the evidentiary
value of statistical differences. It must, however, be carefully distinguished from certain everyday
meanings attributed to the term "significance," and it must be carefully applied to data in
discrimination litigation, in most cases with the help of experts who are qualified in statistical
analysis and preferably in the application of such analysis in a legal setting.
Statistical proof alone may be sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation if the disparities are sufficiently incriminating. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. at 307-08. McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 71 (D.C. Cir, 1982); Pouncy v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, statistical proof may be
combined with other forms of proof, and plaintiffs often introduce nonstatistical evidence in
order to buttress their statistical showing of discrimination and bring the "cold numbers con-
vincingly to life." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
6
 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977); see also
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 32!, 338-39 (Rehnquist J., concurring) (Employers "may
endeavor to impeach the reliability of statistical evidence, they may offer rebutting evidence, or
they may disparage in arguments or in briefs the probative weight which the plaintiffs' evidence
should be accorded." Id).
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 360-61 n.46;
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 497-99.
See cases cited infra note 50.
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"selection" situations in which the model appears at first blush to be ap-
plicable. This has led some courts and litigants to use this model incorrectly
and to reach erroneous conclusions about the meaning of statistical evidence in
particular cases.
This article analyzes the strengths and limitations of the statistical model
applied in Castaneda and Hazelwood, reviews its use and misuse in discrimi-
nation litigation as a means of testing whether a selection system adversely af-
fects particular groups, and suggests alternative models for those situations in
which the Castaneda/Hazelwood model should not be applied. 9
I. THE CASTANEDA/HAZELWOOD ANALYSIS
In Castaneda, the petitioner alleged that Mexican-Americans had been in-
tentionally discriminated against in selection for grand jury duty in Hidalgo
County, Texas."' Part of the petitioner's proof involved a showing that the
number of Mexican-Americans selected as grand jurors was less than propor-
tional to the representation of Mexican-Americans in the eligible juror pool."
A statistical test was employed to establish that the difference was large enough
to rule out chance as a reasonable explanation.' 2 Similarly, in Hazelwood, the
plaintiffs alleged that blacks had been discriminated against in the hiring of
teachers in a school district in Missouri.' 3 Part of the proof in that case involved
9 The specific questions to which such statistical models help provide answers are
whether and to what degree observed disparities in the results of a selection system, which sug-
gest discrimination, could be attributable to one or more chance mechanisms that are neutral
with respect to the particular groups being compared rather than to systematic or purposeful non-
neutral mechanisms. This article analyzes the reliability of the statistical model applied in
Castaneda and Hazelwood for that purpose. It does not address how the answers to those questions
should be combined with a consideration of the magnitude of the differences in selection results
between groups (as evidenced by the size of the observed disparities) or other evidence of a non-
statistical nature in the case to reach a finding on the ultimate issue of discrimination.
'° Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 483-84. The petitioner in Castaneda was a
Mexican-American who had been convicted of a crime in a Texas state court. Id. at 485. He
challenged his conviction — first in the state courts and then, after exhausting his state remedies,
in the federal courts on a habeas corpus petition — on the ground that the grand jury that in-
dicted him had been selected in a discriminatory fashion. Id. at 485-92. Prior to Castaneda, the
Supreme Court had held that it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution to try a defendant who has been in-
dicted by a grand jury from which persons of his race or of an identifiable group to which he
belongs have been purposefully excluded. Id. at 492-95 and cases cited therein.
" Id. at 485-89.
' 2 Id. at 494-97.
13 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 301. Hazelwood was brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See supra not,.. 3 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court has held that there are two different types of actionable violations of Title VII —
disparate treatment and disparate impact. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15. Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Proof of
discriminatory intent is required to establish a claim of disparate treatment. Id. Disparate im-
pact, on the other hand, occurs when an employer adopts practices that, while neutral on their
face, affect one group more adversely than others and cannot be justified by business necessity.
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a showing that the number of blacks hired was less than proportional to the
representation of blacks among qualified public school teachers in the relevant
labor market.'* The Hazelwood Court employed the same statistical test used in
Castaneda to determine whether the difference was large enough to rule out
chance as an explanation."
It will be useful to discuss the Castaneda test in more detail. Over an eleven
year period, the number of persons summoned to serve on grand juries in .
Hidalgo County was 870. 16 The Mexican-American percentage of the popula-
tion of the county was estimated to be 79.1 % ." The Court reasoned that if
selections were made on a random basis from that population, about 79.1% , or
688 of the 870 grand jurors would be Mexican-Americans." The actual
number of Mexican-Americans called was 339. 19
The Court in Castaneda found it useful to inquire about the probability of
selecting so few Mexican-Americans under a hypothetical assumption that the
870 jurors were drawn randomly. 20 Since jurors were not in fact drawn ran-
domly, but rather, under the Texas "key man" system, on the personal judg-
ment of jury commissioners, random drawings were used by the Court as a
standard or benchmark for a selection process that is free of discrimination."
The Court implicitly adopted a particular set of properties (or "model") for
such random drawings: (1) a fixed probability of selection of a Mexican-Ameri-
can on each drawing (in this case 79.1 %); (2) only two possible outcomes for
each drawing, in this case Mexican-American and non-Mexican-American;
and (3) an independent drawing each time, so that the chance of selection of a
Mexican-American on each drawing is not affected by the outcomes of the
prior drawings." Under these assumptions, which define a "binomial model"
Id. Discriminatory intent is not a necessary element of a disparate impact claim. Id. Under either
theory, statistical proof will normally play an important role in establishing or rebutting a claim
of classwide discrimination. Id. Hazelwood was a disparate treatment case, i.e. , the plaintiffs there
alleged that the defendant school district had intentionally limited its hiring of black teachers on
the basis of race. Id. at 301.
14 Id. at 303.
" Id. at 311 n.17. The Court in Hazelwood did not reach the question whether the de-
fendants had actually engaged in discrimination but remanded the case to the district court for a
determination, inter alia, of the geographic scope of the appropriate labor market. Id. at 313. The
labor market proposed by the plaintiffs (which included the City of St. Louis) contained a much
higher percentage of black teachers than did the labor market proposed by the defendants (which
excluded the City of St. Louis). Id. at 310-11. The Court applied the statistical test employed in
Castaneda to both these proposed labor markets in order to "highlight the importance of the
choice" between the two. 433 U.S. at 311 n.17. The Court stated that its analysis demonstrated
that if the former were adopted the statistical proof would support the Government's case that
Hazelwood had engaged in discrimination, while if the latter were adopted the statistics would
not support and might even weaken the Government's case. Id.
1° Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 487 n.7.
17 Id. at 486.
" Id. at 495-96.
" Id. at 487 n.7.
2° Id. at 496 n.17.
21 Id. at 484.
22 Id, at 496 n.17.
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for drawings, the probabilities of drawing different numbers of Mexican-Amer-
icans are given by the "binomial distribution. " 2s
In order to assess the possibility that the shortfall in the number of Mexi-
can-Americans called to serve on grand juries could have occurred by chance,
the Court used the binomial model to calculate a measure by which to calibrate
the significance of the difference between the 339 observed and the 688 ex-
pected Mexican-American grand jurors. 24 This measure, the standard devia-
tion, was calculated to be 12. 25 The difference between 688 and 339 was there-
fore 29 standard deviations, and the Court noted that "a detailed calculation
reveals that the likelihood that such a substantial departure from the expected
value would occur by chance is less than 1 in 10 140 . "26
The Court also noted a rule of thumb for the number of standard devia-
tions that would imply a high enough improbability of the observed result to
warrant rejection of the original hypothesis: "As a general rule for such large
samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed number
is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the
jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist. " 27
II. THE BINOMIAL MODEL
The binomial model employed by the Court in Castaneda is one of the
simplest and most useful analytic tools available to evaluate statistical evidence
in discrimination cases. 28 The model can be applied to any situation that con-
sists of a series of events, such as drawings or selections (which statisticians
sometimes refer to as "trials") with the above-specified properties of two pos-
sible outcomes for each trial, fixed probabilities associated with each outcome,
and independence among the trials. Such a series of events is called a "binomi-
al experiment." Simple physical prototypes of binomial experiments include
flipping a coin a number of times and drawing poker chips of two types — e.g.,
of two different colors — from a fishbowl containing a large number of such
chips. In the former case the two possible outcomes for each trial are heads or
tails and the probability associated with each, assuming we are dealing with a
fair coin fairly tossed, is .5. In the second case the two possible outcomes cor-
respond to the two different colors of the chips, say black and white, and the
probability associated with each outcome is given by the ratio of the number of
chips of that color in the bowl to the total number of chips in the bowl. For ex-
23 Id. The binomial model also requires that there be a fixed — as opposed to a random-
ly determined — number of drawings, see MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at
132. This condition has been of less interest in discrimination litigation and we do not treat it in
this article.
24 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17.
25 Id.
26 Id,
27 Id.
28
 For a thorough discussion of binomial models and distributions, see, e.g.,
MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 130-43, 270-91.
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ample, if the bowl contains 10,000 chips, 6,000 of which are white and 4,000 of
which are black, the probability of drawing a white chip — assuming the chips
are otherwise identical and have been well mixed together in the bowl — would
be .6 and the probability of drawing a black chip would be .4. 29
For any given binomial experiment, once the number of trials and the
probability on each trial of observing one of the two possible outcomes — let us
call that outcome a "success"" — are specified, we can calculate an "ex-
pected" number of such successes by multiplying that probability by the
number of trials. 3 ' For example, if we were to draw 10 chips from the bowl
described above, the expected number of white chips would be 6, obtained by
multiplying .6 by 10. And this is consistent with common sense — if 60 percent
of the chips in the bowl are white, we would expect that on average 60 percent of
the chips drawn from the bowl will be white. We would not expect, however,
that every time we draw 10 chips from the bowl exactly 6 of them will be white.
It is clear that any result from zero to 10 white chips is possible, although we
would not expect all such possible results to occur with equal frequency. For
example, we would expect that 5 or 7 white chips would be drawn fairly often,
4 or 8 white chips somewhat less frequently, and more extreme outcomes only
on occasion. This commonsense insight into the variability of the results of
drawing chips from a bowl corresponds to what statistical theory tells us about
the relationship between the expected value of a binomial experiment and the
actual observed outcomes. The results of a binomial experiment are, as the
Supreme Court noted in Castaneda, "likely to fall in the vicinity of the expected
value," 32 and fall in such a way that the further away a result is from the ex-
pected value, the less frequently it will actually be observed as the outcome of
29 The sum of the probabilities of the two outcomes of a binomial experiment will
allways equal 1.00. This is so because a probability of 1.00 corresponds to a certainty, that is that
an event will happen 100% of the time. Since for each trial in a binomial experiment there are
only two possible outcomes, their joint probability — that is the probability one or the other out-
come will occur — must equal 1.00. For example, in drawing chips from a bowl containing only
white and black chips, it is certain that for each binomial trial (i.e., for each drawing) the result
will be a chip of one of these two colors. Furthermore, since the two outcomes are mutually ex-
clusive, their joint probability is derived by simply adding their individual probabilities. See
MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 77-81.
" For convenience of reference, social scientists often refer to one binomial outcome as
a "success" and the other as "failure." See MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at
130-31. These designations are arbitrary and have no effect on the binomial calculations, which
are not affected by what labels one puts on the outcomes — i.e. , the probability of observing par-
ticular combinations of the two outcomes are determined in the same fashion regardless of which
outcome is designated a "success" and which a "failure." But since it does make it easier to
describe the calculations, we will at times use the success/failure terminology.
3i The "expected value" of a statistical experiment, binomial or otherwise, refers to the
long-run average result. That is, if the experiment were repeated a large number of times, we
would expect that the average of the results would be close to and, as the experiment was
repeated over and over, be converging on the expected value. Of course, as discussed in the text,
the actual results of any single experiment will in most cases be somewhat lower or higher than
the expected value.
" 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
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such an experiment. A measure of the extent of this "spread" of the distribu-
tion of possible results around the expected result -- that is, the extent to which
the actual outcomes are likely to diverge from the expected value — is the
distribution's standard deviation. As the Supreme Court noted in Castaneda,
the number of standard deviations any particular result is from the expected
result is inversely related to the probability of such an occurrence."
The binomial model permits the calculation of an exact probability for
each possible outcome of a binomial experiment, and the set of outcomes
paired with probabilities defines that experiment's probability distribution."
For example, in the experiment discussed above of drawing 10 chips from a
bowl, the probability of drawing exactly 6 white chips can be precisely deter-
mined as .251 — that is, if we repeated the experiment a very large number of
times, we would expect 25.1 % of those times exactly 6 white chips (and 4 black
chips) would be drawn. Similar exact probabilities may be determined for each
possible outcome from zero to 10 white chips." Other than when the number of
trials is fairly small, however, the computations required to calculate exact
binomial probabilities are quite burdensome. Fortunately, for large sample
sizes (i.e. , large numbers of trials) the binomial probability distribution may be
approximated quite accurately by the normal probability distribution, 36 a
" Id.
34 Such a probability distribution is often displayed in the form of a graph with the
possible outcomes (expressed in terms of numbers of successes) plotted along the x-axis and the
corresponding probabilities plotted along the y-axis.
n Those probabilities, which would be the same for any binomial experiment con-
sisting of 10 trials with the probability of a success on each trial equal to .6, are as follows:
Number of White Chips
	 Probability
0 0+
1 .002
2 .011
3 .042
4 .111
5 .201
6 .251
7 .215
8 .121
9 .040
10 .006
36 The normal probability distribution can be described graphically by the familiar,
bell-shaped "normal curve." This curve reaches its highest point at the mean or expected value
of the distribution and declines symetrically on each side of the expected value. The curve is con-
cave downward in the vicinity of the expected value, gradually becoming concave upward further
away from the expected value (hence the bell-shape). En terms of probabilities, these
characteristics of the normal curve mean that: (i) results in the vicinity of the expected value are
more probable than those further out on the curve; (ii) results equidistant from the expected
value on either side have the same probability of occurrence; (iii) past the point on each side of
the expected value where the curve becomes concave upward, the probabilities decline "faster"
than the distance from the expected value increases (e.g., a result twice as far from the expected
value is less than one-half as likely to occur). The "normal" distribution should not be thought of
as the common or usual distribution for observed frequencies, as its name might imply. The prin-
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distribution whose properties are well known."
In particular, we can convert the results of a binomial experiment to a
variable that has a standard normal distribution," called a Z-statistic or
Z-score. The value in this conversion is that the probability associated with any
particular Z-score may be obtained from standard tables published in many
statistics texts. For the binomial distribution, the Z-score is defined as the dif-
ference between the expected and observed outcomes of the binomial experi-
ment divided by its standard deviation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's sug-
gestion in Castaneda that differences between the expected and observed out-
comes in excess of two or three standard deviations are statistically significant
is equivalent to saying that Z-scores in excess of two or three are statistically
significant
cipal significance of the normal distribution in statistics and probability theory is explained infra
at note 37.
" The normal distribution is probably the most important distribution in statistics and
probability theory. One reason for this is that (as demonstrated in a set of theorems referred to as
"central limit" theorems) under very general conditions sums of non-normal random variables
are approximately normally distributed. This makes it possible to make accurate probability
calculations for such sums when the exact probability distributions are either unknown or, as in
the case of the binomial, difficult to compute. (The number of successes in a binomial experiment
can be thought of as the sum of a random variable that for each trial takes on the value 1 for a suc-
cess and zero for a failure.) See MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 275-90,
351-56.
38
 The "standard" normal distribution is the normal distribution whose mean (or ex-
pected value) equals zero and whose standard deviation equals one.
39
 The results of a binomial experiment may be considered statistically significant if,
under the assumptions of the binomial model, the probability of observing an outcome that dif-
fers from the expected value by as much or more than the actual outcome is less than a specified
value. This specified value is often set at 1%, 5%, or 10%, although 5% is the most commonly
used. See supra note 4; see also Harper, Statistics as Evidence of Age Discrimination, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
1347, 1354 (1981).
The Castaneda Court's reference to disparities of more than two to three standard devia-
tions is simply a shorthand way of applying a test of statistical significance. While the specifica-
tion and interpretation of levels of statistical significance in discrimination litigation pose difficult
legal and statistical questions that are beyond the scope of this article, the Supreme Court's im-
plicit discussion of statistical significance in Castaneda has engendered some confusion on the sub-
ject that merits brief comment. Some courts have interpreted Castaneda as establishing two to
three standard deviations as the absolute minimum level at which statistical significance may be
found and statistical evidence considered probative. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 647 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147,
152 (4th Cir. 1980); Cormier v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 1 32,204, 22,608 (W.D. La. 1981); Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Works, 22 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 1 30,738, 14,816 (D.D.C. 1980); Gay v. Local No. 30, 489 F. Supp. 282, 311
(N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982). This is incorrect for a number of reasons.
First, as a careful reading of the Court's footnote in Castaneda demonstrates, the two to three
standard deviations standard was offered as a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for statistical
significance. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 496-97 n.17. The disparities there were of
such magnitude that the Court was not required to reach, and did not decide, the question of
what number of standard deviations would be necessary as a minimum to support a finding of
statistical significance.
Second, as a matter of statistical interpretation, statistical significance is not an all-or-
nothing proposition; and, therefore, the specification of any particular cut-off point for
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The binomial test as applied in Castaneda may now be summarized in
terms of a set of equations using certain standard symbols to represent the
variables discussed above. If we let,
n = the number of binomial trials in a particular experiment,
p = the probability of a success on each trial,
E = the expected number of successes,
0 = the observed number of successes,
SD = the standard deviation,
then the statistical analysis in Castaneda would proceed as follows:
(1) Determine "n" and "p " for that particular binomial experiment. In Castaneda,
"n" was 870, the total number of persons selected for grand jury duty, and
significance, whether expressed in terms of numbers of standard deviations or probabilities, is
essentially arbitrary. Accordingly, results that fall just short of whatever level is being used to
establish "significance" should not be rejected out of hand and certainly not, as some courts have
done, be treated as positive evidence of no discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia,
454 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 620 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); Garrett v. R. J. Reynolds Indus., 81 F.R.D. 25, 19 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas, (BNA) 13, 19, 23-34 (M.D.N.C. 1978). For example, even if the 5% level is
used in the first instance as the threshold for statistical significance, a result that is significant at
the 6%, 7%, or 10% level should be regarded as suggestive, entitled to some (although not
dispositive) weight, and considered in light of the other evidence — both statistical and
nonstatistical — in the case. Some courts have taken this approach. See Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 128, 165, 223-34 (N.D. Tex.
1980) and cases cited. The problem of imposing arbitrary cut-off points for statistical significance
is exacerbated by the apparent practice of some courts of using the upper end of the Supreme
Court's suggested range, three standard deviations, as the minimum requirement for statistical
significance. See, e.g., Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors, 622 F.2d
1235, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Co., 21 Empl Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 41 30,406, 13,308 (W.D. Va. 1979); Garrett v. R. J. Reynolds Indust. 81 F.R.D. 25, 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 13, 19 (M.D.N.C. 1978). See also Department of Labor, Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Order No. 760a1 (March 10, 1983) (suggesting that for
disparate treatment analysis statistical disparities must be " 'gross' (in excess of five or six stand-
ard deviations). ... "). Three standard deviations correspond to a level of statistical significance
of less than 0.3%, which is below even the most stringent of the standard levels of 1%. Rejecting
as statistically "insignificant" any difference between the observed and expected results of a
selection process that does not exceed three standard deviations is supported neither by standard
social science practice nor by the Supreme Court's language in Castaneda.
Third, looking only at the number of standard deviations tends to make statistical signi-
ficance the only criterion for statistical evidence and ignores the magnitude of the observed dis-
parity. A large disparity may not be "statistically significant" under a statistical model and test
because there are too few cases to establish statistical significance. With such small samples,
however, the fact that a disparity is not statistically significant does not necessarily mean that it is
not "practically significant" in the sense that it may be of a size that is considered important and
indicative of possible discrimination. Conversely, a small disparity that is of little or no practical
significance may nevertheless be shown to be "statistically significant" if it is based upon a
sufficiently large sample of cases. For example, with very large samples a disparity in selection
rates between two groups of less than 1% could be found to be statistically significant. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether for most purposes such a small disparity would be deemed to be of
any practical importance. See generally MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 307;
BALDUS & COLE, supra note 4, at 9.41.
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"p" was .791, reflecting the fact that Mexican-Americans made up 79.1% of
the population from which grand jurors were drawn."
(2) Calculate the expected number of successes — by multiplying "n" times
E=n xp
In Castaneda, the expected number of Mexican-American jurors was 688: 4 '
E =870 x .791 = 688
(3) Calculate the standard deviation — for the binomial distribution associated
with that "n" and "p" by taking the square root of the product of the number
of trials, the probability of a success, and the probability of a failure:
SD =Vn x p x (1-p)
In Castaneda, the standard deviation was approximately 12: 42
SD =1/870 x .791 x .209 =)ari ,	= 11.99
(4) Calculate the Z-score — that is, the number of standard deviations by
which the number of successes actually observed differs from the number of ex-
pected:
40 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17. The determinations of "n" and "p" are obviously of
critical importance to the binomial analysis. While such determinations are fairly straightforward
in the coin-tossing and chip-drawing models discussed in the text, in discrimination litigation
they can be matters of some complexity and are often the subject of considerable dispute between
the parties. In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court dealt with two common problems in this area.
First, with respect to defining the relevant number of binomial trials, i.e. " n," the Court made
clear that only hiring decisions made by the Hazelwood School District after it became subject to
Title VII in 1972 could be considered in the analysis. 433 U.S. at 309-10. The court of appeals
had simply considered the racial composition of Hazelwood's teacher population, which included
persons hired prior to, as well as after, 1972. Id. at 308. The significance of this for the binomial
model is that "n" should be defined in terms of a "flow" figure, that is as the number of persons
selected in some sense — e.g., hired, fired, picked for a jury, etc. — during a legally relevant
period. Defining "n" in terms of a "stock" figure, that is, an aggregate population figure like
the teacher population in Hazelwood, without reference to the selections made during some
specified period will generally be incorrect. Second, the Court in Hazelwood made clear that the
appropriate way of defining "p," the relevant probability of success on each binomial trial, is to
determine the percentage of blacks in a properly defined, qualified labor pool. Id, at 308 n.13.
The demographic characteristics of this pool, and hence the "p" of the binomial model, will
vary, often considerably, depending on both the qualifications that are deemed necessary for the
job in question and the geographic areas from which the employer is deemed to draw potential
employees. Both of these factors were in dispute in the lower courts in Hazelwood and are dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in its opinion. In addition, the Court indicated that the percentage
of blacks in the actual applicant pool would also provide a relevant benchmark for comparison
with an employer's hiring of blacks and hence an alternative measure of the appropriate "p" for
the binomial analysis. Id. See also New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586
(1979). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (applicant data not required to
test discriminatory effect on women of height and weight requirements for prison guard positions
since requirements themselves may have discouraged other-wise qualified women from applying
for those positions).
4 ' 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17.
42 Id.
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SD
In Castaneda, the observed number of Mexican-Americans was 339, 44 so the
Z-score was:
688 – 339 Z =	 – 29.1
1 1 .99(5) If the Z-score is greater than 2 or 3, regard the conclusion that the disparity
observed was the result of random fluctuations as suspect. In Castaneda, the Z-score was
so large that under the assumptions of the binomial model the likelihood of
observing such a small number of Mexican-Americans (if selections were made
randomly with respect to race) was practically ni1. 45 The Court therefore con-
cluded that the statistical disparities established a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in that selection process."
III. A CASE OF UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTIONS:
THE USE AND MISUSE OF THE BINOMIAL MODEL
IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
The Supreme Court's reliance on formal statistical techniques in Castaneda
and Hazelwood to assess the probative value of data evidencing possible
discrimination has naturally been emulated by lower courts and litigants."
The resulting increase in the accuracy of the analysis of statistical evidence in
many discrimination cases has been one of the positive, and was clearly one of
the intended, consequences of the Court's use of those techniques in the
Castaneda and Hazelwood opinions.
Furthermore, the particular test employed by the Supreme Court — the
binomial — has a number of advantages for use in a litigation context. First,
the binomial model is relatively easy to understand and apply. The examples of
coin-tossing and drawing chips from a bowl provide homely, but realistic
" In the actual definition of the Z-score for the binomial distribution, the numerator is
defined as the observed number minus the expected number. See, e.g., MOSTELLER, ROURKE &
THOMAS at 288. We have reversed the order of the terms in the numerator here and elsewhere in
this article. This reversal, which has the effect of changing the sign — but not the magnitude —
of the Z-scores, was done to produce positive Z-scores when the observed number of selections of
the particular group being examined is less than the expected number (which will be the situation
in most of the examples and cases we consider). It is convenient for purposes of discussing the
binomial and other statistical models in the context of the language of the Supreme Court to refer
to positive rather than negative Z-scores. This change in the sign of the Z-score has no effect
whatsoever on the statistical analysis. Because the standard normal distribution, to which the
Z-score refers, is symmetric about zero, the statistical significance of any Z-score depends solely
on its absolute value and not on its sign (i.e., a Z-score and its negative correspond to exactly the
same level of statistical significance).
44 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.l7.
" Id. at 496.
46 Id.
47 See infra note 50.
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models of binomial experiments." And the often arcane concepts of probabil-
ity, expected values, and even statistical variability and standard deviations are
relatively understandable in the context of the binomial model. Second, the
calculations required are fairly simple. Only three variables are involved (the
number of trials, the probability of a "success" on each trial, and the observed
number of successes), and the most complicated computation is taking a square
root — a function now available on inexpensive pocket calculators. Litigants,
though well-advised to have expert assistance, can themselves perform the
calculations under the varying assumptions about the size of the eligible pool,
the number of legally relevant selections, and any other relevant characteristics
of the selection process. Third, the binomial model may be applied to a large
number of "selection" situations, such as the selection of jurors or the hiring of
employees, that are often the subject of discrimination litigation." According-
ly, the binomial model has become the statistical test of preference in
discrimination litigation and has been used by courts in a wide variety of
cases."
48 See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
49 One limitation of the binomial model, however, is that it may only be applied to
selection situations that produce dichotomous results, e.g., called for grand jury duty/not called;
hired/not hired; promoted/not promoted. In cases involving continuous or interval variables,
such as employee salaries or changes in salaries, or scores on tests or rating systems, statistical
techniques other than the binomial must be used to test whether differences between groups with
respect to such variables support an inference of discrimination. See Baldus & Cole, supra note 4,
at 12-13, One particular statistical technique that has been used in recent years in an increasing
number of such cases is multiple regression analysis. See, e.g., Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp.
873, 884-87 (D.D.C. 1981); Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 696-99 (D.D.C. 1981);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, (N.D. Tex. 1980); see generally Finkelstein,
The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 737 (1980). Multiple regression analysis permits an estimate of the average difference be-
tween groups on a continuous variable, like salary, after accounting for differences between
members of the groups in certain characteristics that are likely to affect that variable, such as
(with respect to salary) years of experience and years of education. Multiple regression analysis is
more complex both conceptually and computationally than a binomial analysis. But if properly
applied and interpreted with the assistance of expert testimony, multiple regression
analysis can be a useful tool in discrimination litigation for determining whether observed dif-
ferences between groups can be attributed, in whole or in part, to the nondicriminatory factors
that are included in the analysis. See Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM, L.
REV. 702 (1980); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof
and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975).
5° Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 673 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g
denied, 668 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1982) (job assignments for longshoremen); Rivera v. Wichita Falls,
665 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981) (testing of police recruits); Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Service, 665
F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981) (promotions of postal workers); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654
F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 662 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 51
(1982) (faculty wage levels); EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), reh'g
denied, 680 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982) (hiring: binomial applied to
applicant flow data); Hameed v. Iron Workers, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980) (admission to ap-
prentice programs); Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979) (school assignments of teachers); Otero v. Mesa
County Valley School Dist., 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977) (hiring of teachers and support per-
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The reliability of the binomial model, however, depends on certain
assumptions being met about the selection process being studied. The Supreme
Court in Castaneda and Hazelwood did not make clear what these assumptions
are, or how they limit the applicability of the model. A problem arises because
these assumptions — of fixed probabilities, only two outcomes, and in-
dependences' — are satisfied in. some but not all of the selection situations in
which the binomial model would appear to apply, i.e. , in which an "n" and a
"p" can be identified and the binomial calculations outlined above can be per-
formed. As a result, the binomial can be and has been used by courts and
litigants to test for discrimination in cases where it is inappropriate and pro-
duces incorrect results. In the following sections we discuss the assumptions
underlying the binomial model, explore the problems that arise in discrimina-
tion litigation when they are not met, and suggest alternatives to or modifica-
tions of the binomial in such cases.
A. The Probability of Selecting a Member of the Group in Question is Fixed
1. Cases in Which This Condition May be Violated
The first condition assumed to be met for the appropriate application of
the binomial model requires that the particular class assertedly under-
represented constitute a fixed percentage of the pool of eligible persons from
which selections are made. In terms of the formulae described above, this
means that the probability "p" that a class member will be chosen each time a
selection is made can be specified at the outset of the selection process and does
not change throughout the process.
This condition is satisfied for all practical purposes in many types of selec-
tion processes." For example, in most jury selection and hiring cases (as in
sonnel); Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1381
(8th Cir. 1977) (granting of parole to prisoners); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp.
224 (N. D. Tex. 1980) (hiring of professional, managerial, and clerical workers); Bryan v. Koch,
492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (closing of municipal
hospitals); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 475 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Ark. 1979), modified, 648 F.2d 1129
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981) (demotions and layoffs); Younger v. Glamorgan
Pipe & Foundry Co., 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) f 30,406 (W.D. Va. 1979) (tran .sfers of
employees among job departments); Cooper v. Univ. of Texas at Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187
(N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981) (faculty hiring); Rich v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 467 F. Supp. 587, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,111 (D. Colo. 1979) (promotions).
51 See supra notes 28, 29 and accompanying text.
" This condition is strictly satisfied only when sampling from an infinite population or
sampling with replacement. The latter requires that each person who is selected be put back in
the pool and be eligible for all future selections. In the example of drawing poker chips from a
bowl, sampling with replacement would mean that after a chip is drawn (and its color recorded),
it is immediately put back into the bowl before the next selection is made. Obviously in sampling
with replacement, the probabilities of success and failure remain the same for each trial, since the
composition of the eligible population is constant throughout the experiment. Most selection
situations to which the binomial is applied in discrimination litigation do not involve sampling
with replacement, i.e., the persons selected (e.g., for a grand jury, for a job, etc.), are removed, at
least for a certain time, from the eligible pool.
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Castaneda and Hazelwood), the number of persons selected is in most cases only a
very small fraction of the total pool of persons eligible for selection. In these cir-
cumstances, the percentage of class members — for example, blacks — in the
eligible pool may be treated as effectively constant, despite the fact that minute
changes in the racial composition of the pool occur as persons selected are
withdrawn. Nevertheless, for other selection processes such as promotions,
layoffs, or testing, the number of persons "selected" (i. e. , promoted, laid off,
or passing the test) is frequently a not insignificant fraction of the total eligible
pool. In these circumstances, the percentage of blacks in the eligible pool
changes as selections are made, and the assumption of the binomial model of a
constant "p" is not met. In such a case, it is not appropriate to use the
binomial model to test for the statistical significance of an observed under-
representation of class members among the persons selected. In particular,. if
blacks, for example, are selected at a disproportionately low rate, the percent-
age of blacks remaining in the eligible pool will tend to increase as selections
are made. This in turn will cause the binomial model to err on the "conser-
vative" side from a plaintiff's point of view, i.e. , a statistical analysis based on
that model will overstate the likelihood that differences in selection rates could
be attributed to chance and understate the statistical significance of the racial
disparities observed.
This conservative bias inherent in the binomial model under the circum-
stances described above can be demonstrated in a simple hypothetical. Assume
we are analyzing two cases each involving the selection of 100 persons from a
population that is 50 percent white and 50 percent black. In the first case the
total population from which the selections are to be made is 200,000 persons,
but in the second case the total population is only 200 persons.
In the first case, the number of persons selected, 100, is so small compared
to the total population of 200,000 that the racial composition of the population
will be essentially unaffected by the selection process itself. Thus, the probabil-
ity of selecting a black on the last "drawing" will be approximately the same as
it was on the first "drawing," namely .5. But in the second case, in which half
of the persons eligible are selected, the racial composition of the population
from which the selections are being made will change over the course of the
selection process as those persons selected are withdrawn from the eligible pool.
In this case it is likely that the probability of selecting a black in the last draw-
ing will be different — and depending on the results of the selection process,
possibly quite different — from .5.
For example, consider the most extreme situation in which there have
been 99 persons selected, all of whom are white. What is the probability that
the 100th person selected will be black? The answer to this question obviously
depends on whether those selections were drawn from the large or the small
eligible pool: In the former case, after those 99 selections have been made,
there are 199,901 persons left in the pool of whom 99,901 are white and
100,000 are black. Thus, the probability of selecting a black on the next draw-
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ing has shifted only slightly from .5 to .5002 ( = 100,000/199,901). And of
course, for all the preceding selections the probability of selecting a black was
even closer to the original probability of .5. Thus, the deviation from the
assumption of a constant "p" for each selection is negligible in this case, and
the binomial model will provide accurate estimates of the statistical significance
of the observed underrepresentation of blacks among the selectees.
On the other hand, in the case of the smaller population, after those 99
white selections there are 101 persons left in the pool, of whom one is white and
100 are black. Thus, the probability of selecting a black on the 100th draw has
increased from .5 to about .99 ( = 100/101). And, of course, the probabilities of
selecting a black on preceding draws, while smaller than .99, were in many
cases also much larger than .5. 53 Obviously, the assumption underlying the
binomial model that each time a selection is made the chance of selecting a
black is the same has been violated, and as a result, the binomial model will not
provide a reliable means of assessing the likelihood that an observed underrep-
resentation of blacks is simply the result of random fluctuations inherent in the
sampling process.
As indicated above, if a binomial analysis is applied to the selection data
for the smaller population and the initial black representation in the eligibility
pool of 50 percent is used as the fixed probability of selecting a black
throughout the selection process (i. e. , if .5 is used as the "p" in the binomial
formulae), the underrepresentation of blacks will appear to be less statistically
significant than it actually is. In the extreme case we have been considering, in
which 100 whites and zero blacks were selected, this bias will make little prac-
tical difference because the racial disparities will in any event appear very
highly significant. In closer cases, however, such inappropriate use of the
binomial model could make statistically significant results appear insignificant
or only marginally significant."
2. Alternatives to the Binomial Model — Tests of Differences
Between Proportions
Since the binomial assumption of a fixed probability of selection on each
trial fails when the number of persons selected is a substantial fraction of the
eligible population, an alternative statistical test must be used in those cir-
cumstances. Such alternative tests involve looking at the selection data in a
slightly different fashion from that used in the binomial.
In the selection situation examined previously, we looked at the division of
selectees into racial or ethnic groups and applied the binomial model to corn-
" For example, assuming that all previous selections had been white, the probability of
selecting a black on the 99th draw would be about .98, on the 50th draw about .66, and on the
25th draw about .57.
34 See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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pare the number of those selected of a given group with an expected number of
selectees from that group. The logic of this approach is that if, for example,
blacks represent X percent of the eligible pool we would expect in a racially
neutral system that they would represent approximately X percent of those
selected. The same data can also be looked at by considering the selection
percentages for each group from its own eligible population. The logic of this
approach is that if, for example, Y percent of the eligible whites are selected,
we would expect in a racially neutral system that approximately Y percent of
the eligible blacks would also be selected. These selection percentages can be
compared, not by use of a binomial test, but by use of tests designed to test dif-
ferences between proportions.
One such test is referred to as the "normal theory test" of the difference
between two proportions. Like the Z-score test for the binomial model," this
test relies on a normal approximation to a distribution—in this case the
distribution of the difference between the two proportions." The difference-in-
proportions test is usually expressed in terms of the following standard nota-
tion:
PO = proportion of the total eligible population selected
p i = proportion of the first group selected
p2 = proportion of the second group selected
n i = the number of persons of the first group in the eligible population
n2 = the number of persons of the second group in the eligible
population
The difference in proportions, i.e. , selection rates, for the two groups, p i – p2 ,
is tested by calculating a Z-statistic as follows:
P2 — PI
po (1-po)	 + 1/n2)
The Z-statistic here has approximately a standard normal distribution, so
that the same procedure is used in conducting the test as in the binomial test of
Castaneda . 57
For example, consider a situation in which 100 persons 12 black and 88
white, have been selected from an eligible population of 200 persons, 40 black
and 160 white. These data are set out below.
" See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
56 This test also requires that there only be two groups and two possible outcomes for
each group (e.g., blacks and whites/hired and not hired). Furthermore, the selections must be in-
dependent of one another, that is, the selection or non-selection of one person cannot influence
the outcome of the selection process for any other person. For a discussion of this test, see
SNEDECOR & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 124.
" In other words, if the Z-score is of a sufficient magnitude, the conclusion that the
disparity between the two proportions is the result of random fluctutions is regarded as suspect.
See supra text accompanying notes 27, 45-46.
Z –
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Table 1
Hypothetical Selection Process
Black	 White	 Total
Selected 12 88 100
Total Eligible 40 160 200
With 50 To of the eligible population selected, the binomial cannot be used
to determine the probability that in a racially neutral selection system as few as
12 blacks would be chosen out of 100 selections. The difference-in-proportions
test, however, can be used to compare the observed proportion of selections
from the black eligibles, 12/40 or .30, with the corresponding proportion for
whites, 88/160 or .55. In terms of the notation defined above:
p i
 = 12/40 = .30
p2 = 88/160 = .55
pp = 100/200 = .50
n i — 40
n2 =160
Z — 	 .55 — .30 	 .25 
-/(.5) (.5) (1/40 + 1/160) 	 .088
Z = 2.83
This result is significant at the one-percent level and, since the Z-score exceeds
2, under the Castaneda standard as well."
Other tests besides the normal theory test of a difference between two pro-
portions may be used in appropriate circumstances. When the sample sizes are
small the "hypergeometric" or equivalently "Fisher's Exact" test is used
because it is based on exact probability calculations and thereby avoids the nor-
mal approximations used in the normal theory test, which are inaccurate for
small samples." The "chi-square" test, discussed briefly below, is an
equivalent test for a difference between two proportions. (The chi-square test
may also be used for differences among more than two proportions.) The
choices between these tests are often based on narrow technical grounds and
are best made with expert statistical assistance.
3. Misuse of the Binomial in Judicial Decisions
An example of a case in which the improper use of the binomial model
may have had decisional significance is provided by Inmates of the Nebraska
Penal and Correctional Complex a. Greenholtz. 60 In Nebraska Inmates, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit used the binomial model ap-
se See supra text accompanying note 27.
59 See note 86 infra. For an example of the use of the hypergeometric in a case involving
the selection of hospitals for closure, see the discussion of Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), infra at Section IIIC.
60 567 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
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proach, as set out in Castaneda and Hazelwood, to analyze the selection of Ne-
braska prisoners for paroles' A class of Native-American and Mexican-
American inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex had
brought an action under section 1983 62 alleging that the Nebraska Board of
Parole had denied them discretionary parole on racial and ethnic grounds in
violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.° A major part of the plaintiffs' proof involved a statistical showing that
the Native-American and Mexican-American inmates who were eligible for
discretionary parole received such parole at substantially lower rates than did
eligible white and black inmates." The data on granting of discretionary
parole, stratified by racial and ethnic groups, were as follows: 65
Table 2
Inmates Eligible
For Parole Inmates Paroled 66
Percentage
of Total
ParoleesNumber
Percentage
of Total
Eligibles Number
Percentage
Paroled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
White 590 65.4 358 60.7 66.9
Black 235 26.1 148 63.0 27.7
Native
American 59 6.5 24 40.7 4.5
Mexican-
American 18 2.0 5 27.8 0.9
TOTAL 902 100.0 535 59.3 100.0
61 Id. at 1375-79.
62 42 U.S.C. 5 1983.
63 567 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
64 Id. at 1371-73. Since this was a 5 1983 claim alleging discrimination in violation of
the Constitution, the plaintiffs had to prove that they were the victims of intentional discrimina-
tion; mere disparate impact without discriminatory purpose would be insufficient to make out a
constitutional violation. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976). "Disparate impact
is not irrelevant, but is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution." Id. at 242. In contrast with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits both intentional discrimination in employment
and employment practices that have a disparate impact on a group protected by the statute and
that are not justified by business necessity even if adopted without discriminatory intent. See supra
note 12. However, statistical proof that the challenged governmental action bears more heavily
on some races or ethnic groups than others will generally be an important element in the proof of
purposeful discrimination, at least in class actions. Id. at 239-48. Moreover, when the racial
disparities shown by such proof are severe enough, they alone may support an inference of inten-
tional discrimination, Id.; Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 307-08. Accord-
ingly, in most cases involving classwide claims of purposeful discrimination, plaintiffs include
statistical proof of disparate impact. Conversely, if the defendants can show that the challenged
governmental action does not have a significant disparate impact on a particular class, they will
in most instances defeat any claim that such action was undertaken with the intent to
discriminate against that class.
65 See Nebraska Inmates, 567 F.2d at 1371.
66 The percentages in column 4 are derived by dividing the numbers in column 3 by the
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The district court's analysis in Nebraska Inmates 67 of these data is worth
reviewing briefly because it is typical of the statistically unsophisticated ap-
proach common in judicial decisions in discrimination cases prior to the Su-
preme Court's endorsement of formal statistical hypothesis testing in Castaneda
and Hazelwood." The district court's analysis consisted of a simple arithmetic
comparison of the percentages listed above in column (2) and column (5): that
is, the court compared the percentage that each group represented in the eligi-
ble population with that group's percentage representation in the population of
parolees. 69 For example, the court noted that while 65.4% of the 902 inmates
eligible for parole were white, 66.9% of the 535 inmates receiving parole were
white, a difference of only 1.5% 7 ° The corresponding percentage disparities for
blacks, Native-Americans, and Mexican-Americans were in each case 2% or
less, which the court found to be an insignificant difference. 2 ' Accordingly, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs' statistical evidence was not probative of
disparate impact and contributed nothing toward making out a case of pur-
poseful racial and ethnic discrimination in Nebraska's discretionary parole
process. 72
The district court's analysis in Nebraska Inmates of the statistical evidence is
defective in at least two important respects. First, the simple comparison of
percentages undertaken by the Court is insensitive to the size of the popula-
tions to which the percentages refer. Statistical theory demonstrates that the
larger the sample size, the more statistically significant any particular absolute
difference in such percentages is, all other things being equal."
Second, simply comparing the percentages a minority group represents in
the pre- and post-selection populations as the district court did, can be mis-
leading since as the former percentage diminishes, increasingly smaller differ-
ences between the two percentages can become significant. 74 In fact, using the
corresponding numbers in column 1. The percentages in column 5 are derived by dividing each
of the numbers in column 3 by the number 535, the total of column 3.
67 436 F. Supp. 432 (D. Neb. 1976), reo'd, 567 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 841 (1978).
68 The district court's decision, which was handed down in 1976, predated Castaneda
and Hazelwood, which were decided during the summer of 1977.
69 Id. at 439-42.
7° Id. at 441-42.
" Id.
72 432 F. Supp. at 441-42. And, after analyzing the plaintiffs' nonstatistical evidence,
the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie equal protection case and
entered judgment for the defendants. Id. at 442.
" For example, the percentages the Nebraska Inmates district court compared would be
the same whether the numbers of eligible and paroled inmates in each racial and ethnic group
were only one-tenth as large or ten times as large as those shown in Table 1. Yet the racial and
ethnic underrepresentation revealed in those percentage disparities may be insignificant when a
total of only 90 inmates are involved, but quite significant when the population numbers 9,000.
But there is no systematic, statistically reliable way to take variations in sample size into account
when a simple arithmetic comparison of percentages is used as the measure of statistical dis-
parity.
74 For example, consider a situation in which two minority groups are subject to a selec-
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district court's approach, it is impossible to show disparate impact for any
minority group whose percentage of the eligible population is less than what-
ever minimum difference in percentages is set as a threshold for establishing
significance. For example, as the court of appeals in Nebraska Inmates pointed
out, since Mexican-Americans represented only 2.0 percent of the eligible pop-
ulation, even if zero Mexican-Americans had been paroled, the statistical
shortfall would have been only 2.0 percent, which the district court held to be
insignificant:75
 Therefore, even if the Nebraska Parole Board followed a policy
of completely excluding Mexican-American inmates from discretionary parole,
the district court's test would indicate that the resulting disparity was "insignif-
icant." Thus, the district court's approach in Nebraska Inmates has the perverse
effect that, all other things being equal, the more "minority" a group is (i.e. ,
the smaller its representation in the relevant eligible population) the more dif-
ficult it is to show that a selection process has an adverse impact on that
group. 76
After properly rejecting the district court's treatment of the statistical
evidence, the Eighth Circuit in Nebraska Inmates undertook its own analysis of
the parole data, and in doing so quite naturally attempted to apply the new
learning of the Castaneda and Hazelwood cases. The court reasoned that the 6.5
percent representation of Native-Americans and the 2.0 percent representation
of Mexican-Americans in the prisoner population from which persons were
selected for discretionary parole were analogous to the 79.1 percent figure that
Mexican-Americans represented in the population from which persons were
selected for grand jury duty in Castaneda." Accordingly, the court reasoned that
if the 535 discretionary paroles had been distributed proportionately among all
racial and ethnic groups, Native-Americans would have received about 35
(535 x .065) and Mexican-Americans about 11 (535 x .02) of those paroles. 78
Thus, the differences between those "expected" and the "observed" numbers
tion process. Assume the first group represents 40% of the eligible pool and receives 35% of the
selections, while the second group represents 6% of the eligible pool and receives 1% of the selec-
tions. In each case, the statistical disparity under the approach employed by the district court is
5% (40% minus 35% for the first group, 6% minus 1% for the second group). However, for the
first group the selection process results in a "shrinkage" in their proportional representation in
the relevant populations of only 12.5% (.05/.40), while for the second group the drop from 6% to
1% represents a shrinkage of over 80% in their population share (.05/.06 = .833). When the
data are looked at in this fashion, it seems clear that the second group has been more adversely
impacted by the selection process than the first group. Whether the adverse impact of the selec-
tion process on either group is statistically significant depends on the sizes of both the eligible and
the selected populations. However, for any given set of sample sizes the statistical significance of
the 5% disparities described above will be greater for the second group than for the first group.
" 567 F.2d at 1377 n.I8.
76
 The court of appeals also noted that this problem — which is a function of the
minority group's small comparative size in the eligible population — bears no necessary relationship
to the problem of small sample size discussed above, which is concerned with the absolute size of
the selected population. 567 F.2d at 1377 n.18.
" Id. at 1377-79.
78 Id. at 1378.
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of paroles were 11 (35 - 24) for Native-Americans and 6 (11 - 5) for Mexican-
Americans." Still tracking closely the Castaneda model, the appeals court
calculated the standard deviations for both groups; and, since the difference
between the expected and observed numbers of discretionary paroles was less
than two standard deviations in each case, the court concluded that the
statistical evidence did not substantially support the plaintiffs' prima facie case
that racial and ethnic discrimination infected Nebraska's parole decisions."
What the appeals court in Nebraska Inmates failed to do was examine the
assumptions underlying the binomial model before applying it to the statistical
proof on discretionary paroles. The court's conclusion that the percentage
figures it plugged into the binomial equations were analogous to the population
percentages the Supreme Court used in Castaneda and Hazelwood to calculate
the statistical significance of the ethnic and racial underrepresentations in those
cases appears on the surface to be correct. But, unlike the situations in those
cases, in Nebraska Inmates the number of persons selected was a substantial
percentage of the eligible pool: 535 out of 902 or 59.3% of the inmates eligible
for discretionary parole received it. 8 ' Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that
the percentages of Native-Americans and Mexican-Americans in the eligible
pool remained constant during the selection process. And, in fact, by the end of
the selection process, the Native-American percentage had increased to 9.5%
and the Mexican-American percentage to 3.5%, 82 which are substantially
higher than 6.5% and 2.0% — their respective representation in the eligible
pool before any selections were made. Thus, when the appeals court used the
latter figures in the binomial formulae as the respective, fixed probabilities of
selecting a Native-American or Mexican-American on each of the 535 "draw-
79 Id.
" Id. at 1374. The calculations performed by the Court may be summarized as follows:
(a) Native Americans
p	 59/902 = .065
Expected number = 535 x .065 = 35
Observed number = 24
Standard deviation Nn(p)(1-p)
4535(.065)(.935) = 5.72
Z - 35-24 = 1.92
5.72
(b) Mexican-Americans
p = 18/902 = .02
Expected number = 535 x .02 	 10.7
Observed number = 5
Standard  deviation = 
11535(.02)(.98) = 3.24
Z = 10.7-5.0  = 1.76
3.24
Id.
81 Id. at 1371.
82 There were 35 Native Americans and 13 Mexican-Americans among the 367 in-
mates who did not receive parole. See supra Table 2.
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ings," it was understating the probability of randomly selecting a member of
one of these two groups on later drawings and thus biasing its calculations in
the direction of finding non significance.
Application of an appropriate statistical test to the data in Nebraska In-
mates demonstrates the practical importance of the Eighth Circuit's misap-
plication of the binomial model. For example, using the difference-in-
proportions test (which compares the success rate for one group with that of the
rest of the population83) for Native-Americans, the results obtained are quite
different from those obtained with the binomial. Of the 59 Native-Americans
eligible for discretionary parole, 24 or 40.7% received it. 84 The corresponding
figures for all non-Native-Americans are 511 out of 843 or 60.6% and for the
entire inmate population 535 out of 902 or 59.3% : 85 In terms of the symbols
and formulae for this test set out above, these numbers can be expressed as
follows:
p i = 24/59 = .407 = (the parole rate for Native-Americans)
132
 = 511/843 = .606 — (the parole rate for non-Native-Americans)
po = 535/902 = .593 = (the parole rate for all inmates)
n i
 59 = (the number of Native-Americans eligible for parole)
n2
 = 843 = (the number of non-Native-Americans eligible for parole)
The Z-statistic may now be calculated as follows:
P2 — P1 
"V(PO) (1-Po) (1/n 1 + 1/n 2 )
.606 — .407 
V(.593)(.407)(1/59 + 1/843)
3.01
A similar calculation for Mexican-Americans yields a Z-score of 2.75. 86 Thus,
the expected number of paroles diverges from the observed number of approxi-
mately three standard deviations for both Native-Americans and Mexican
" See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
04 567 F.2d at 1371.
85 Id.
86
 The calculation for Mexican-Americans may be summarized as follows:
p,
p2
= 5/18 =
530/884
.278
= .600
po 535/902 — .593
n1 18
n2 = 884
Z = .600 — .278
V(.593)(.407)(1/18 + 1/884)
Z = 2.75
If the size of the eligible population (i.e., total number of inmates eligible for parole) were small
(say, below 20) or if the smallest expected number of "successes" (i.e., number of paroles) for
any group were very small (say, below 5), then the normal approximation might not be ade-
quate, and use of the hypergeometric would be recommended. See SNEDOCOR & COCHRAN, supra
note 4, at 127. Neither condition obtains here, however.
July 1983]	 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION	 947
Americans — not slightly less than two standard deviations for both groups as
the appeals court mistakenly calculated. Since the court, following the
Castaneda decision, indicated it would regard differences of two to three stand-
ard deviations as statistically significant, it is possible its decision in Nebraska In-
mates would have been different if the court had not been misled about the
statistical significance of the discrepancies in parole rates through its improper
use of the binomial analysis."
4. Guidelines for the Use of the Binomial Model: The Size of the Population
Selection Rate
There is no bright-line standard for the population selection rate — that
is, the total number of persons selected divided by the total number of persons
in the population from which selections are made — that separates those selec-
tion situations for which the binomial model is accurate from those for which it
is inaccurate. Rather, as the population selection rate increases the binomial
gradually becomes unreliable. As a rough rule of thumb, however, if the per-
centage of the eligible population selected is 10 percent or less, the binomial
87 This mistaken use of the binomial model appears in a number of other court deci-
sions, and even in the testimony of experts in discrimination litigation. For example, in Taylor v.
Teletype Corp., 475 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Ark. 1979), modified, 648 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981), both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' experts incorrectly applied
the binomial model to a situation where the number of persons "selected" (in that case demoted
and laid ofi) was a substantial percentage of the pool of persons eligible for selection. 475 F.
Supp. at 961-64. The defendants' expert, applying the binomial analysis to data on demotions,
calculated a Z-score of 1.4, which the court found did not support any inference of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 961-62. But the difference-in-proportions test applied to the same data - yields a Z-score
of 1.84. This difference may have been important since the court appears to have recognized any
Z-score above 1.645, which is the 5% level of significance on a "one-tail" test (see BALDUS &
COLE, supra note 4, at 307-08), as probative of adverse impact and supportive of a prima facie case
of discrimination. The plaintiffs' expert, working with data on layoffs, similarly misapplied the
binomial model, although the Z-score resulting from his analysis of 2.23 was considered high
enough by the court to support the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination. Id. at 962-63; see also
EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 650-54 (4th Cir. 1983) (promotions;
binomial applied to data on promotions from certain grades where between 37% and 43% of
eligible employees received promotions); Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 673 F.2d
742 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 688 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1982) (job assignments; binomial applied
to data on assignment of "deck and wharf" jobs to longshoremen where 40% to 50% of the
workforce received such assignments); Harrell v. Northern Electric Co., 672 F,2d 444 (5th Cir.
1982), modified, 679 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 449 (1982) (hiring; binomial
applied to applicant flow data where 30% of applicants were hired); Wilkins v. University of
Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 662 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981), Cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 51 (1982) (wage levels; binomial applied to data on "underpaid" employees where
49% of relevant employee pool were in "underpaid" category); Hameed v. Iron Workers, 637
F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980) (admittance to union apprenticeship programs; binomial applied to
rating system where 96% of applicants achieved cut-off score and to selections for apprentice
positions where selection rate was 67%); Davis v. Dallas, 487 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(hiring; binomial applied to applicant-flow data where 18% of the applicants were hired). Marsh
v. Eaton Corp., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 57, 62 n.13 (N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd in part and
rey'd in part, 639 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1981) (job placements; binomial applied to data on placement
of new hires in lower level positions where 82% of new hires placed in those positions).
948	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:925
model will produce reasonably accurate results. If the overall selection percent-
age exceeds 10 percent, the difference-in-proportions test should generally be
used. 88
As a practical matter, this means the binomial model will generally be ap-
plicable in situations where selections are being made from the general popu-
lation in a particular area, such as the selection of grand jurors in Castaneda, or
from an area-wide labor pool, such as the hiring of teachers in Hazelwood. In
such cases, the number of selections being made will rarely be so large as to af-
fect the demographic or work-force statistics from which the probability of a
success on each binomial trial, the "p" of the binomial formulae, is derived.
When the eligible population is more narrowly circumscribed, such as in an ap-
plicant-flow analysis in a hiring or promotion case, care must be taken before
applying the binomial since it is possible the selection rate will be substantial.
Furthermore, the binomial will rarely be appropriate in cases challenging
employment or other types of tests since it is unusual for the passing rate on
such tests to be below 10 % . 89
B. Each Binomial Trial Can Have Only Two Possible Outcomes
The second condition assumed to be met in applying the binomial model
requires that there be only two possible outcomes for each trial. For example, if
the model is to be used to analyze the selection rate for blacks, it is necessary to
" See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 4 9A.12 (1980 & Supp. 1982) (suggesting 10% rule
of thumb, while citing other authorities that suggest other figures from 1% to 20%). If the overall
selection rate exceeds 90%, the binomial analysis may be applied to data on the "non-selected"
population (to test the difference between the expected and observed numbers of nonselected per-
sons of a particular group) since the overall "non-selection" rate will necessarily be below 10%.
" It has been argued that the binomial model is never an appropriate means of deter-
mining whether pass-fail data demonstrate that an employment test has a statistically significant
adverse impact on a particular group. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment
Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978). Shoben acknowledges that the
binomial may be used to compare, for example, the racial composition of a sample population
with that of the larger population from which it was selected; but she argues that because a test
divides the sample population into four relevant categories, two racial groups, each composed of
passers and failers, the binomial is inapplicable. Id. at 795-96. Sometimes, however, a condi-
tional test is performed in which the persons who pass the test are the persons "selected" by the
test. Hence, the total number of passers defines "n," the number of binomial trials, and the
percentage of the group in question among the test-takers defines "p," the probability of success
on each trial. An expected number of passers for the particular group can be calculated by
multiplying
 n times , and a standard deviation can be calculated using the usual binomial for-
mula,4n x p x (1 - p). The problem with using the binomial model in such a case is that — as in-
dicated in the text — usually a not insubstantial proportion of the persons taking a test pass it,
thereby rendering the binomial calculations inaccurate. However, if a particular test had a low
overall pass rate (i.e., below 10%), the binomial model would provide as reliable an estimate of
the statistical significance of any racial, ethnic, or sexual disparities among those "selected" as it
would in a hiring or any other type of selection case with a comparable overall selection rate.
However, since as a practical matter the binomial model will not be applicable in most testing
cases, we agree with Shoben that the binomial should generally be avoided and the difference-in-
proportions test used in its stead when one is examining differential pass-fail rates on tests.
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divide the entire population into two categories — blacks and nonblacks. This
is fairly straightforward when the model is used to test the effects of a selection
process on one particular group, as in Castaneda (Mexican-Americans) and
Hazelwood (blacks). When, a selection process allegedly has an adverse impact
on two (or more) distinct groups, however, the question arises how the selec-
tion experience of one disfavored group should be treated when the data on
another disfavored group are being analyzed. For example, if an employer's
hiring system appears to have an adverse impact on both blacks and Hispanics,
how should Hispanics be counted• when the binomial analysis is applied to the
black selections (and vice versa when the Hispanic selection rate is analyzed)? 9°
Simply including Hispanics in the nonblack category would have the effect of
lowering the nonblack selection rate and reducing the perceived disparity in
selection rates between blacks and nonblacks. In other words, the impact of the
hiring process will appear less adverse to blacks if they are compared with all
"nonblacks," including the disfavored Hispanics, than if they are compared
only with the favored whites.
There are two possible adjustments to the binomial model that can be
made in these circumstances. The first and simplest is to combine the data on
blacks and Hispanics and perform the binomial calculations on the selection
rate for this combined "minority" category. Such a combination may be ap-
propriate if there is some evidence that the selection system being examined
discriminates against both groups in a similar fashion and if both groups were
included in the certified class.
However, if the alleged discrimination is different in nature or if the class
as certified includes only one of the two groups, it may not be appropriate to
combine the data on the two groups. For example, it would seem inappropriate
to base a finding of discrimination against blacks on statistical evidence of
adverse impact that would be insignificant but for the inclusion of data on
Hispanics who are not part of the plaintiff class. This suggests that in these cir-
cumstances the binomial model should be adjusted to analyze the selection
process as it affects blacks and whites only (i. e. , not treat the second disfavored
group, Hispanics, as part of either the black or white group for purposes of the
analysis).
Both of these possible adjustments can be illustrated through the use of a
simple example. Consider a hypothetical employer who hires 100 persons from
a labor pool that is 50% white, 25% black, and 25% Hispanic. The racial
distribution of the hirees is 64 whites, 18 blacks, and 18 Hispanics. Applying
the binomial model to the entire selection process for either blacks or Hispanics
would lead to the following calculations:
9° In terms of the physical model of drawing chips from a bowl, this would correspond
to having chips of three different colors, e.g., black, brown, and white, in the bowl, If we assume
that both black and brown chips are underrepresented among the chips drawn from the bowl, the
question considered in the text is when the selection of black chips is being analyzed, how should
the brown chips be counted (and vice versa).
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Expected number of hires = 100 x .25 = 25
Observed number of hires = 18 
Standard deviation 1/100 (.25) (.75) = ff.75 = 4.33
	25-18	 7	Z  	 1.62
	
4.33	 4.33
This result is not quite significant at the five percent level and is below the two-
to three-standard suggested in Castaneda as well. If, however, either of the two
adjustments to the model discussed above are used, different results are
obtained.
First, if blacks and Hispanics are combined into a "minority" category
the eligible pool would then be 50% minority and 50% white, and the hire'
would be 36 minority and 64 white. The Z-score calculation for this adjusted
model would proceed as follows:
Expected number of hires = 100 x .50 = 50
Observed number of hires = 36
Standard deviation =3100 (.5) (.5) = 5
	50-36 	14
=	
– 2.8
5	 5
Second, the model can be adjusted to compare only blacks versus whites.
This can be done by removing the Hispanics from both the labor pool and the
group of persons selected and then recalculating the expected value of black
hires and the standard deviation. Blacks represent one-third (.251.75) of this
adjusted black-white eligible pool and 22% (18/82) of the black-white selec-
tions. Accordingly, the binomial calculations after these adjustments are made
would be as follows: 9 '
Expected number of hires =82 x .33 = 27.1
Observed number of hires = 18 
Standard deviation =1/82 (.33) (.67) =4.26
Z_  27.1 –18 = 2.14
4.26
The results with these adjusted models are significant at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively, and — since the difference between expected and observed
values in each case is more than two standard deviations, — under the Costa-
neda standard as well. Thus, a selection process that adversely affects both
blacks and Hispanics as compared, either jointly or separately, to whites could
under a simple, unadjusted binomial analysis appear not to have a statistically
significant adverse impact on either one."
91 Since in this example the data for Hispanics mirror exactly those for blacks, the ad-
justed analysis for Hispanics obviously would produce results identical to the results for blacks
described in the text.
92 In these types of cases, the plaintiffs or the court must identify the nature of the
discriminatory prOcess they are reporting on and testing. Different kinds of discrimination will
call for different statistical comparisons between and among groups.
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The Nebraska Inmates" decision discussed above provides an example in an
actual judicial decision of a failure to consider this feature of the binomial
model. The plaintiffs there alleged discrimination against two distinct groups
— Native Americans and Mexican-Americans — and the appeals court per-
formed separate binomial analyses to test for discrimination against each one.
When it analyzed the parole experience of Native-Americans, however, the
court included Mexican-Americans in the comparison group of non-Native-
Americans who were supposedly not discriminated against, and vice versa when
it analyzed the parole rate for Mexican-Americans. As explained above, this
has the effect of reducing the apparent disparity in parole rates between each of
these disfavored groups and the rest of the inmate population. Thus, even if the
binomial had otherwise been applicable to the parole data in Nebraska Inmates,
the failure of the circuit court to adjust the binomial calculations to take into ac-
count the fact that discrimination was being alleged against two groups would
lead to an underestimation of the statistical significance of the observed
disparities."
Furthermore, the difference-in-proportions test, which as discussed above
may be applied in certain selection situations where the binomial is not
available (because the probabilities of selection are not the same for each trial),
shares with the binomial the assumption that the population being studied con-
sists of only two groups. And, therefore, the same adjustments required for the
binomial analysis when discrimination against two or more distinct groups is
alleged — that is, either combining the two disfavored groups or eliminating
the experience of all other disfavored groups from the selection data when the
selection rate for one disfavored group is being analyzed — must be made in
order to apply the difference in proportions test in such circumstances as well.
For example, in the Nebraska Inmates case if the difference-in-proportions
test is applied to a combined Native-American and Mexican-American group,
the Z-score for the disparity in parole rates between that group and the rest of
the inmate population is 4.08, a highly significant result. 95 Since in Nebraska In-
93 Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978); see supra notes 60-87 and accompanying
text for the discussion of Nebraska Inmates.
94 If the binomial calculations had been adjusted so as to compare Native Americans
and Mexican-Americans separately with only blacks and whites, the Z-scores would have in-
creased from 1.92 to 1.98 for Native Americans and from 1.76 to 1.81 for Mexican-Americans. If
Native Americans and Mexican-Americans had been combined into one group, the 'binomial
calculations would have yielded a Z-score of 2.58 for the shortfall of parolees in that combined
group.
95 The difference-in-proportions calculations for the combined Native Amer-
ican/Mexican-American class would proceed as follows. The data are derived from Table 2,
supra, and the symbols are those defined supra at text accompanying notes 55-56.
pi 29/77 = .377
p2 506/825 = .613
po 535/902 = .593
n i — 77
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mates the Native-Americans and Mexican-Americans were part of the same
plaintiff class and the alleged discrimination against both groups arose in part,
according to plaintiffs, from a common source — a supposed ignorance and in-
sensitivity on the part of parole board members to the foreign cultures and val-
ues of these two groups 96 — combining the parole data for both groups argu-
ably would have been appropriate in the circumstances of that case.
Even if the plaintiffs were charged with proving discrimination against
each group separately, however, the difference-in-proportions test should be
adjusted so that each disfavored group is tested separately against the rest of
the inmate population. For example, to test the underrepresentation of Native-
Americans, the Mexican-Americans should first be taken out of the data base
and new population figures determined for a revised "non-Native-American"
class consisting solely of blacks and whites. This yields new (and higher) selec-
tion rates for non-Native-Americans and for the population as a whole. A com-
parable adjustment could be made when analyzing the Mexican-American
data. When this is done, the Z-score for the disparity in selection rates for
Native-Americans is 3.12 and that for Mexican-Americans is 2.88, slightly
higher, and thus slightly more statistically significant, than the results
calculated earlier when all the data, including those for the other disfavored
group, were used in each analysis." These results give a better assessment of
n 2 = 825
Z = 	 .613 — .377 
1(.593)(407)(1/77 + 1/825)
Z	 4.03
96
 567 F.2d 1368, 1370.
97
 The difference-in-proportions calculations with the adjustments discussed in the text
would proceed as follows. The data are derived from Table 2, supra, and the symbols are those
defined supra at text accompanying notes 56-57.
(a) Native Americans v. Whites and Blacks
p,
p2
=
=
24/59
506/825
— .407
= .613
p o = 530/844 — .600
n,
n2
=
=
59
825
Z .613 - .407
1(.6)(4)(1/59 + 1/825)
Z	 3.12
(b) Mexican-Americans v. Whites and Blacks
p i = 5/18 = .278
p2 = 506/825 - .613
po 511/843 — .606
n 1 = 18
n2 = 825
Z .613	 — .278
V(.606)(.394)(1/18 + 1/825)
Z = 2.88
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the extent to which the parole rate for each group differs from the white and
black inmate parole rate than did those based on the unadjusted data. 98
C. The Binomial Trials are Independent of Each Other
The third condition assumed to be satisfied in applying the binomial mod-
el requires that successive trials or drawings be independent of one another, in
the sense that subsequent to any given number of selections there remain the
same probabilities of selection for each of the two groups at the next selection
(i.e., the probabilities on each selection are not affected by the outcome of any
other selection). This condition is satisfied when each selection is made truly
"independently" in a physical sense and when the selections are not tied to
each other in some way. This condition is violated when, for example, the
method of selection is altered as the result of the outcomes on other trials or the
unit of selection is groups of persons and not individuals (and the model is ap-
plied to data on the individuals selected).
An example where the independence condition was not satisfied is pro-
vided in the case of Bryan v. Koch." In Bryan, the plaintiffs sought to prevent the
City of New York from closing or reducing the number of beds in 4 of the 13
acute care municipal hospitals in the city on the ground that the selection of
those four particular hospitals for closure or bed reduction was tainted by dis-
crimination against blacks and Hispanics.'°°
At trial, the plaintiffs compared the proportion of minority patients or
beds in the hospitals slated for closure or reduction with the proportion of
minority patients or beds in the entire municipal hospital system."' Table 3
gives the numbers of minority and non-minority patients served in the 13
municipal hospitals based on a 1979, one-day census of emergency room pa-
tients. 102
96 Still another approach to statistical testing when discrimination against two or more
groups is alleged is what is referred to as the chi-square test of homogeneity of binomial propor-
tions. For a discussion of this test in a standard statistics text, see SNEDECOR & COCHRAN, supra
note 4, at 201. The chi-square test is a test of whether or not the selection rates are the same for all
groups. If the test at a given level of significance finds that there are differences, then a subse-
quent test is used to establish the significance of a difference for any particular group. If this test
were to be applied to the parole data in Nebraska Inmates, black and white inmates would first be
grouped to form one category, because discrimination against blacks was not alleged. If this were
not done, a test result that indicated that there were statistically significant differences among the
groups might be attributable, at least in part, to a difference between blacks and whites, a dif-
ference that is without interest in the case. Applied to the three categories of white-black com-
bined, Native American, and Mexican-American, the test finds differences between the selection
rates for the groups significant at the 1% level.
99 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
100
 492 F. Supp. 212, 215-17.
Id, at 218-21.
102 Id.
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Table 3
Hospitals 
4 Hospitals
Selected for
Closure or
Reduction
9 Hospitals Not
Selected for
Closure or
Reduction
Total System
(13 Hospitals)
Distribution of Minority Patients
Among Municipal Hospitals
Bryan v. Koch
Minority	 Non-Minority
Patients	 Patients	 Total
162	 1273
1760	 548	 2308
2871	 710	 3581
Although the plaintiffs in Bryan did not carry out exactly this calculation,
applying the binomial method they applied to other data on beds to these data
on patients, plaintiffs would proceed as follows. Taking as "n" the total num-
ber of patients "selected" for closure or reduction, 1273, and as "p" the pro-
portion of minority patients in the entire eligible population, .802
( =. 2871/3581), the plaintiffs would compare the observed number of minority
patients selected, 1111, with the expected number, 1021, calculate aZ-score
equal to 6.33, and conclude that the difference was highly significant. 1 °3
As the district court found, however, the application of the binomial
model was erroneous, because the model presumed that patients were independ-
ently selected for "closure or reduction" when in fact hospitals were selected
for closure or reduction.'" When a hospital is closed, all the patients in it are
"closed" out, so that there is no process of independently selecting patients.
The difference is crucial for the quantity of evidence pointing towards discrimi-
natory selection. If patients are independent units, then there is very strong
evidence that selection is in some manner related to minority status. But if
hospitals are the units, then since only 4 of 13 hospitals were selected, it is
much more probable that an outcome that picked two or even three or four
1 °' The calculations for the binomial test are as follows:
(1) n - 1273
p	 .802
	
o = 1111	 •
(2) E - 1273 x .802 = 1020.95
(3) SD - n x	 - p) - 14.22
(4) Z	 (1111 - 1020.95)/14.22 = 6.33
The probability of observing a Z-score as large or larger than 6.33 is less than .001.
'°4 429 F. Supp. 212, 219-20.
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"more minority" hospitals could occur by chance even if hospitals were picked
for closure with the same independent probability.
Since the sample of four hospitals is a substantial proportion of the popula-
tion of 13, the hypergeometric distribution is used to test the hypothesis that
hospitals were selected for closure with the same probability for both "more
minority" and "less minority" ficispitals.ms The table below displays the data
for the 13 hospitals.
Table 4
Selection of Hospitals for
"Closure or Reduction"
Bryan o. Koch
"More Minority" "Less Minority"
Hospitals
	 Hospitals	 Total
Selected 2 2 4
Not Selected 4 5 9
Total Eligible 6 7 13
The probability, calculated under the hypergeometric distribution, that
two or more hospitals selected for closure or reduction would be chosen among
the "more minority" hospitals is .68. The value of .68'of observing the result,
given nondiscriminatory selection, is actually greater than .5, and, of course,
substantially exceeds the commonly cited thresholds of .01 , ' .05, and .10. It is
dramatically greater than the probability calculated under the assumption that
patients were independently selected given above, which was less than .001.
Thus, as this case illustrates, there can be serious miscalculations of the
statistical significance of observed differences when the binomial model is ap-
plied to selections that are not truly independent.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE BINOMIAL MODEL
AS USED IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
A. Defining "p" as the Population Selection Rate
One further misapplication of the binomial model that has occurred in dis-
crimination litigation is that courts have sometimes mistakenly defined "p" —
105 A "more minority" hospital is defined as one having a percentage of minority pa-
tients greater than the median percentage of minority patients for the municipal hospital system
as a whole. (This median was 77.8%.) A "less minority" hospital is one whose minority percent-
age is less than or equal to the median. Similar results are obtained when other possible defini-
tions of a "more minority" hospital are chosen.
An alternative test to the hypergeometric for a somewhat different measure of dis-
crimination that was also presented at trial in this case is the Mann-Whitney rank sum test. This
test examines the hypothesis that the hospitals selected for closure are a random sample of the en-
tire group of hospitals. Hospitals are ranked by percent minority, and the test asks if the sum of
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the probability of success on each binomial trial — not as the proportion of the
eligible population who are members of the disfavored group but rather as the
proportion of the population as a whole (or of the favored group) who suc-
ceeded in being selected. 1 °6 These latter proportions, or selection rates, which
do figure in the difference-in-proportions test and could be analyzed by that
test, play no explicit role in the binomial model. Using one or the other of them
as "p" in the binomial equations leads to error.
For example, consider a situation in which 100 persons, 60 males and 40
females, have been hired from a pool of 2,000 applicants consisting of 1,000
males and 1,000 females. In applying the binomial model to test whether the
underrepresentation of females among the hirees is statistically significant, we
would define "p" as the proportion of females in the applicant pool, which is
1000/2000, or .5, and "n" as the number of persons hired, which is 100. The
binomial calculations would proceed as follows:
E=n xp = 100 x .5 = 50
=40 	
SD =1/n x p x (1-p) = V100 x .5 x .5 = 5
E – 0	 50 – 40 Z =	 2.0
SD	 5
A Z-score of 2.0 means that the female shortfall is significant at both the 5 per-
cent level and (though at the borderline) under the Castaneda two- to three-
standard-deviation criterion.
On the other hand, if "p" is defined in terms of selection rates, the results
are quite different. In this example the overall selection rate is 100/2000 or .05,
and the male selection rate is 60/1000 or .06. The logic of this mode of analysis
is that females would have been selected at one or the other of these rates ab-
sent discrimination; therefore, these rates are multiplied not by the number of
selections but by the number of females in the eligible pool, which in this exam-
ple is 1,000 (i.e., n = 1,000), to obtain an expected number of female hires. The
binomial calculations would then proceed as follows with the redefined terms
"n" and "p" designated "n*" and "p').
p* = the overall selection rate
E = n* x p* = 1000 x .05 = 50107
0 = 40
the ranks of those selected for closure is significantly different from the same statistic for those not
selected for closure. See F. MOSTELLER & R. ROURKE, STURDY STATISTICS: NONPARAMETRICS
AND ORDER STATISTICS 56 (1973).
106 See Rivera v. Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleged discrimination
against Mexican-Americans in testing of police recruits: "p" defined as failure rate for white ap-
plicants); Hameed v. Iron Workers, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980) (alleged discrimination against
blacks in admittance to union apprenticeship program: "p" defined as selection rate for all ap-
plicants).
107 It should be noted that this expected number of 50 equals that calculated above using
the proper binomial model. That this is a general result can be seen from the algebraic identity:
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SD =Vn* xp* x (1-p*) = V1000 x .05 x .95 =6.89
= 
 E – O _  50-40
 – 1.45
SD	 6.89
p* the male selection rate
E = n* x p* = 1000 x .06 = 60
O = 10 	
SD =Ain* x p* x (1-p*) 1/1000 x .06 x .94 = 7.51
E –0	 60-40 – 4  Z= 	
_2.66
SD	 7.51
The first Z-score of 1.45 is not significant at the 5 percent level, and the
statistical evidence of female underrepresentation among persons hired would
probably be rejected by most courts as not probative of discrimination. The
second Z-score of 2.66 is significant at the 1 percent level and would probably
be accepted by many courts as highly probative of discrimination against
females in this hiring process. Both results are wrong, however, understating in
one case and overstating in the other the actual statistical significance of the
female shortfall among the persons hired, which is accurately estimated by the
binomial model only if "p" is defined in terms of the proportion of females in
the eligible pool.
The problem with defining "p" in the binomial model in terms of selec-
tion rates is that doing so violates the binomial requirement that the probability
of success on each trial be fixed at the beginning of the binomial experiment
and not vary as a function of the number of trials in the experiment or the out-
comes of those trials. The binomial model in effect compares this known quan-
tity (e.g. the gender composition of the applicant pool) against the results of the
selection process (e.g., the gender composition of the population of hirees).
Selection rates, on the other hand, are themselves derived from the results of
the experiment. And while racial or gender disparities in selection rates are
meaningful indicators of possible discrimination against the adversely affected
groups, the statistical significance of such disparities must be determined
through different statistical tests — principally the difference-in-proportions
test — and not the binomial.'"
(number of selections) x (number of females in eligible pool)
(number of persons in eligible pool)
	
 x (number of females in eligible pool)
The product on the left-hand side is simply "n x p" of the proper binomial model and that on the
right-hand side is the cri* x p*" described above when the probability of success on each
binomial trial is defined as the overall selection rate. Thus, the problem with the latter approach
comes not in determining the expected results of the selection process but in calculating the stand-
ard deviation, which is used to gauge the significance of the difference between the expected and
observed results.
1 " See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference-in-
(number of selections)
(number of persons in eligible pool)
958	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:925
B. Small Size of the Sample Selected
In Castaneda, the Supreme Court recognized that the binomial analysis it
was using was valid only for "large samples.' 109 The sample to which the
Court was referring was the total number of persons called to serve as grand
jurors in Hidalgo County during the period it was analyzing.uo A n %a in gen-
eral, for the selection situations to which the binomial is applied in discrimina-
tion litigation, the relevant "sample size" is simply the total number of selec-
tions — the "n" of the binomial equations.
Expected values and standard deviations for the binomial distribution are
calculated in the same fashion for small samples as for large samples. But for
small samples the tests of statistical significance described in this article and in
Castaneda no longer apply because those tests rely on the normal approximation
to the binomial, and the binomial distribution approximates the normal dis-
tribution well only for sample sizes of sufficient magnitude. Accordingly, for
small samples the Z-statistic obtained by dividing the difference between the
expected and observed results of the binomial experiment by its standard devi-
ation does not have a standard normal distribution. The statistical significance
of any such difference, therefore, cannot be determined accurately by simply
looking up the value of the Z-statistic on a standard normal probability table.
For the same reason the Castaneda Court's suggestion that differences between
the expected value and observed results of more than two to three standard
deviations are statistically significant"' is also not reliable when dealing with
small samples.
The sample size required to make use of the normal approximation to the
binomial is a function of "p" — the probability of success on each binomial
trial. The more extreme "p" is, i.e. , as it gets closer to either zero or to 1.0, the
larger the sample size must be before the binomial distribution will be accu-
rately approximated by the normal distribution. 112 As a rough rule of thumb, if
proportions test.
109
 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
"° Id. at 487.
t" Id. at 496 n.17.
112 For small sample sizes and extreme values of "p," the binomial distribution is very
skewed, with the expected value and the other most probable outcomes bunched closely at one
end of the distribution. For example, for n = 10 and p = .9, the exact binomial distribution is as
follows:
Number of Successes Probability
10 .349
9 .387
8 .194
7 .057
6 .011
5 .001
(For each outcome of less than 5 successes the probability is less than .001.) The normal distribu-
tion, on the other hand, is symmetric about the expected value with probabilities declining
gradually as you move away from the expected value in either direction. A normal curve cannot
be fitted very well to a highly skewed distribution, such as the binomial with n —10 and p .9. In
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the expected value — which equals the product of "n" and "p", — is at least
three standard deviations from the extremes of the distribution (i. e. , from zero
or "n") the normal approximation to the binomial will be quite accurate."'
When this condition is not satisfied, exact binomial probabilities for the ob-
served outcomes may be calculated. 14
CONCLUSION
Statistical evidence has taken on an increasingly important role in litiga-
tion involving claims of discrimination against particular classes of people. The
Supreme Court has recognized the utility of formal statistical tests in assessing
the probative value of such evidence in cases alleging discrimination in viola-
tion of the Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The par-
ticular statistical model used by the Court — the binomial model — is applic-
able to many types of selection processes that are frequently the subject of
dispute in discrimination litigation, such as jury selection and various employ-
ment practices. In those cases, the binomial model is a powerful and, because
of its relative simplicity in conception and application, particularly useful
analytic tool for determining whether observed disparities among different
groups in the results of a selection process support an inference of discrimina-
tion in that process. Lower courts, following the Supreme Court's lead, have
frequently made good use of the binomial model in evaluating the often
conflicting statistical evidence presented by parties in discrimination litigation.
When any statistical model is applied to a set of data, however, care must
be taken to ensure that the requirements of the model are met in the process
that generated the data or, if not met, that the divergence from those re-
quirements does not invalidate the conclusions that are to be drawn from the
model. Lower courts have not always been careful when applying the binomial
model to be sure the requirements of the model — which were not explicitly
spelled out by the Supreme Court — have been satisfied. The applicability of
the binomial model does depend on a number of assumptions about the selec-
tion process being studied. When these assumptions are not met, the binomial
model may not be used or may only be used if certain adjustments are made.
such cases probability estimates for binomial outcomes derived from a normal distribution may
be inaccurate.
1 " In these circumstances it appears that the maximum error in estimating the probabil-
ity that a difference as great as that observed could be the result of random fluctuations is no
more than .025. MOSTELLER, ROURKE & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 290. This is an estimate of
the upper limit of the potential error, and in practice the normal approximation is generally more
accurate, not only when the expected value is further from the extremes than three standard
deviations, but in many cases when it is within three standard deviations of the extremes.
14
 For small sample sizes, these calculations are feasible although cumbersome. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text. Of course, computers can perform such calculations rapidly and •
accurately. Furthermore, there are binomial probability tables available, which for some sample
sizes have been reproduced in readily available statistics texts. See, e.g., MOSTELLER, ROURKE &
THOMAS, supra note 4, at 475-91 (binomial tables for sample sizes 2 to 25 and for 13 values of
"p" from .01 to .99).
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This article has analyzed the requirements imposed by those assumptions,
described selection situations where those assumptions are not met, and sug-
gested alternatives or adjustments to the binomial that may be used in those
circumstances. By insisting on both a careful examination of the assumptions
underlying the binomial model before it is applied as a test for discrimination
and the use of the alternatives and adjustments to the model discussed in the
article when those assumptions are not met, courts and litigants in discrimina-
tion litigation will have greater assurance that the inferences they draw from
the results of statistical tests are ones the evidence truly supports.
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